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1 Summary 
 
The aim of task 2.3 is to collect the most promising and successful experiences 
outside the EU that could add new and interesting perspectives for application 
in EU and to feed into WP2 a wider range of opportunities for contract design. 
The task takes the form of a systematic literature review and this report provides 
a draft version of the outcomes of this review. The final version of the report will 
be provided in month 30. 
The review selected 79 documents, including both peer review papers and 
reports/grey literature having as a scope all countries outside those already 
represented by the CONSOLE partners. 
The main reasons for success identified for the reviewed cases are: a) reducing 
risks linked to results; b) reduced costs for monitoring results; c) farmers’ interest 
and social revenue; d) resources availability; e) additionality; f) relying on existing 
collectives; g) communication; payment setting; h)appropriate intermediaries. 
To a large extent the success factors listed above confirm insights from cases in 
the CONSOLE partner countries. However, they allow the consideration of a 
broader variety of solutions. On the other hand, this also depends on the specific 
institutional context where they are located, which means that potential for 
replication should be taken carefully. 
The fact that a large part of the experiences and certainly of the evidence is 
rather recent encourages the continuation of this task providing updates during 
the whole project life. 
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2 Introduction 
2.1 Scope of task 2.3 
According to the CONSOLE scope (cfr. D1.1), the case studies focused in task 2.3 
are contracts intended as ‘actions related to the provision of public goods using 
contract-based categories and conceptual interpretations (e.g. in economics of 
contracts), but it is not bound to consider only what is legally considered as a 
contract; the scope is actually better defined by solutions‘. More specifically, the 
literature (scientific and ‘grey’ literature) targeted in task 2.3 addresses voluntary 
contracts addressing solutions for the provision of agri-environmental and 
climate public goods (AECPGs) featuring one or more of the following 
approaches: land-tenure related provisions, collective agreements, result-based 
payments, value chain contracts/solutions . Accordingly, regulations are not 
considered in this document. 
Definition of contracts targeted by CONSOLE (cfr. Deliverable D2.4): 
• Result-based/result-oriented contracts: Contracts with a clear 
environmental result as reference parameter. Achieving the result is considered 
both as the reference for modulating the payment or as a condition upon which 
the payment is granted. Therefore, this contract type entails a form of monitoring 
of the results.  
• Collective implementation/cooperation: Contracts implementing or 
relying on an existing formalised cooperation among farmers/actors in view of 
delivering AECPGs. The payment can be issued collectively (collective solutions 
sensu stricto) or distributed directly to the members of the collective. 
• Value chain-based contracts: Contracts focusing on the production of a 
specific private good (e.g. food) that is directly or indirectly linked to the delivery 
of AECPGs. That is for instance the case of traditional products (promoting e.g. 
cultural services-related public goods) and organic food (entailing less harmful 
practices for biodiversity). 
• Land tenure-based contracts: Contracts including land tenure 
arrangements with environmental clauses. 
According to a “traditional” categorisation of policies, task 2.3 will focus on 
‘carrots’ type instruments. The contract solutions focused by task 2.3 can also be 
categorised in the wider context of  payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
schemes defined by Wunder (2007) as “voluntary, conditional agreement 
between at least one ‘seller’ and one ‘buyer’ over a well-defined environmental 
service or a land-use presumed to produce that service”. However, a range of 
transversal contract solutions that include or are expected to affect different 
issues are also envisaged. For instance, aspects dealing with the enhancement 
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of “human capital” such as awareness and/or knowledge of environmental 
services are a transversal and indirect effect of policies on which a growing 
attention in (mainly scientific) literature is present. Such attention is mainly 
devoted as the EU AECPGs schemes are generally considered weak in that 
respect (cfr. §3). Furthermore, documents providing a critical analysis of existing 
case studies useful for the identification of improved solutions will be included 
even though not directly related to the four contract approaches mentioned 
above. 
 
2.2 Objectives 
According to the objective of the deliverable D2.2. “Catalogue of factsheets of 
case studies from outside the EU” the aims of the present document were 
intended to provide a collection of factsheets illustrating a range of case studies 
outside the EU and present them in a standard and structured format.   
Aim of task 2.3 were therefore to collect the most promising and successful 
experiences outside the EU. In principal, the analysis should have been executed 
similarly to task 2.2 and focused on case studies, but mainly based on: literature 
evaluation, a written survey by selected international experts and some very 
specific short studies executed by partners in the respective countries.  
Main countries expected to be included were those where national agri-
environmental policies are implemented since decades as in the EU (e.g. 
Australia, USA and Canada), but further examples from other countries were also 
envisaged. Support in the selected countries was also sought through 
subcontracting In order to achieve that objective. 
 
Revised objectives of task 2.3 in the wider context of WP2 
 
The CONSOLE Project strategy is to analyse the different aspects of contractual 
options for the lasting delivery of AECPGs by EU agriculture and forestry. WP2 aims 
at a structured analysis of existing agri-environmental contract solutions for 
supporting an improved provision of AECPGs by EU agriculture and forestry. The 
WP is based on a comprehensive inventory of existing contracts and the 
development of a diagnostics framework. The diagnostics framework includes 
the necessary data related to the contract inventory with the specification of 
design features and assessment criteria. Task 2.2 together with task 2.3 have the 
goal to provide the inventory of existing and innovative contract solutions to 
outline a wide as possible  range of successful contract solutions in EU (task 2.2) 
and beyond (task 2.3). Similarly to task 2.2, task 2.3 is based on case studies to 
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provide a catalogue of features and conditions of success (or failure) for different 
agri-environmental contracts.  The analysis of the contract solutions provided by 
WP2 will give an overview of key-lessons and innovative solutions to improve the 
design of contracts for the delivering of AECPGs. Learning from the experiences 
of existing solutions identifies potential areas for improvement to be considered 
during the project and feed back into WP1. Also, the in-depth analysis forms the 
basis for further quantitative analysis in WP3 and WP4. Finally, WP2 will achieve 
key lessons and summarize the results, in order to give an overview for policy 
makers on innovative and successful solutions “outside the box”. 
To optimise the usefulness of task 2.3 for the Project, the task objectives have 
been revised: After initial attempts to replicate the activities carried out in 2.2 also 
in selected cases outside the EU, it was decided to rather focus the efforts on a 
systematic literature review including European case studies if not targeted by 
the CONSOLE Consortium and if such case studies can provide useful insights for 
the subsequent activities of the Project. The task will also revise failed experiences 
to provide valuable insights on the potential pitfalls of AECPGs tools. The aim is to 
build a catalogue of experiences from different contexts and that could add 
new and interesting perspectives for application in EU and to feed into WP2 a 
wider range of opportunities for contract design. To notice finally, that task 2.3 
includes the review of scientific literature but it is also specifically focusing on the 
collection of available grey literature such as reports, good practice manuals, 
project evaluations, etc.  
The change in objectives is part of a pending amendment at the time of 
submission of the deliverable. The new proposed description of task 2.3 is as 
follows: 
Task 2.3 Analysis of successful experiences outside Europe (M4-M30) 
Leader: UNIBO; Contributors: BOKU, LUKE, TRAME 
Aim of task 2.3 is to collect the most promising and successful experiences outside 
the EU that could add new and interesting perspectives for application in EU and 
to feed into WP2 a wider range of opportunities for contract design. Activities will 
take the form of a systematic literature review. The task includes the review of 
scientific literature but it is also specifically focusing on the collection of available 
grey literature such as reports, good practice manuals, project evaluations, etc. 
The aim is to build a catalogue of experiences from different contexts and Main 
countries to be included are Australia, USA, Canada, but further examples from 
other countries are envisaged. The review will also include interesting European 
case studies if not targeted by the CONSOLE Consortium and if such case studies 
can provide a more complete view of the issue. The systematic review will 
accompany the work along the project life, with a draft report in month 15 and 
final one in month 30. 
D2.2 Draft report on experiences from outside the EU (M15) 
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Draft report illustrating the case studies carried outside the EU, presented as much 
as possible in a standard and structured format (T2.3) 
 
2.3 Outline 
The D2.2 is organised as follows: after the introductory section (section 2), a 
general background (section 3) is provided. The presentation of the search 
approach to retrieve the case studies and select the best fitting to the objectives 
of task 2.3 is presented in section 4 and the catalogue of the case studies is 
presented with their brief description in section 5. This latter section is organised 
as a “living document” with the case study database presented as an appendix 
to the document. The table will be updated whenever new interesting case 
studies for the CONSOLE Project are found. Finally, section 6 will discuss more in 
detail the most interesting case studies and provides lessons learned resume. 
Section 7 concludes the deliverable providing some general lessons to feed into 
D2.4. 
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3 Contract solutions for AECPGs: review of most critical 
aspects 
   
The provision of public goods from private lands depends on the resource use 
decisions of the land-holders and -managers. Markets work relatively well for 
goods that benefit those who make management decisions. That is the case of 
food production for instance from agricultural lands. However, public goods 
flows affect the society at large and therefore the private market mechanisms 
generate the so called ‘externality problem’ (Jack et al., 2018). Agri-
environmental schemes (AES) include a range of instruments to re-balance the 
tendency of ecosystem managers to provide too little of public goods. Since 
1992, reforms of the CAP have included several AES tools to mitigate the 
environmental impact of European agriculture (Science for Environment Policy, 
2017). The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have effectively 
enabled the implementation of AES and regulated the limitation of 
compensations to costs of compliance incurred (i.e. income foregone or costs 
incurred) (Burton and Schwartz, 2013). The dominant framework of AES regards 
a uniform payment for farmers. The payment is conditional to the uptake of a set 
of actions considered able to reduce the provision of negative externalities or 
improve positive externalities (Hanley et al., 2012). Such payment schemes are 
relatively simple to implement, do not necessitate complicate monitoring and 
do not incur in inequalities concerns (as the same price is offered to farmers for 
undertaking a given action). Nonetheless, such schemes incur in “economic 
problems”, as they typically over-reward “all but the marginal producer” (Hanley 
et al., 2012). That effect is linked to the actual provision of public goods from agri-
ecoystems which is affected by spatial variation of opportunity costs and 
information asymmetries between ‘seller’ and ‘buyer’ of public goods. It has also 
been noted that such payment approach is dominant because there is no 
credible alternatives (Burton and Schwartz, 2013). Considering “policy indicators” 
such as acceptance and uptake, ‘action-oriented’ are indeed successful 
(Herzog et al., 2005). But a range of concerns are raised on the real effectiveness 
of CAP and its AES schemes for the provision of public goods such as biodiversity 
among others (e.g. Pe’er et al., 2014). One of the most critical aspect concerns 
the unsatisfactory assessment of additional effects of AES programmes (Daniels 
et al. 2010). Therefore in 2010 the ENRD and EC reported a “fairly widely held view 
that the tools to maintain and enhance the environment should be more clearly 
results oriented” and also (COM(2010) 672) the “paramount importance” of 
developing new, more cost-effective approaches.  
AES are adaptive and can be revised and improved according to changing 
priorities and to improve their efficiency (Science for Environment Policy, 2017). 
Some aspects where AES should be improved regards: i) Environmental 
 
11 
 
effectiveness that is heterogeneous across EU (Beckmann et al. 2009; Kleijn and 
Sutherland, 2003); ii) Adverse selection effects that drives the uptake of least 
management adaptation and diverted on less productive areas (Burton and 
Schwartz, 2013) and long term behavior concerns that involve the shift of farmers’ 
choice and their intrinsic motivations. Beyond their design, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of AES also depend on “human capital” (WBAE, 2019). This includes 
farmers’ knowledge of the environment, participation or willingness to embark in 
networking and collaboration, and also the question of the extent to which 
farmers are sensitive to agri-environment-climate-related issues. However, it is not 
yet fully clear what factors and contract solutions contribute to overcoming such 
problems of payments for AECPGs (Grima et al., 2016, Romulo et al., 2018).  An 
essential condition for ensuring permanent environmental improvements is to link 
farmers’ uptake to a major attitudinal shift (Morris and Potter 1995; Beedell and 
Rehman 2000; Wilson and Buller 2001, Burton Kuczera and Schwarz 2008). The 
action oriented scheme featuring current AES, entails however that farmers’ 
adoption depends mainly on commercial interests and often on a limited need 
of practice adaptation (Harrison et al. 1998; Wilson and Hart 2000; Schmitzberger 
et al. 2005). Therefore, human capital shifts are a clear weaknesses of dominant 
AES schemes. That aspect is therefore to be considered in task 2.3 to find 
evidence of experiences able to improve the issue. 
Jack et al., (2018) identify context dynamics, environmental, socio-economic 
and political context-related lessons to improve the design of incentive-based 
mechanisms. These include:  
 The need of tailoring more elaborated schemes when marginal benefit of 
service provision is not constant. That includes for instance the building up 
of collectives accounting for different configurations of participants to be 
environmentally effective. 
 The necessity of measuring the environmental effects of a policy and 
therefore the need of appropriate proxies relating to the ecosystem 
functions of concern. Also, proxy used to monitor is relevant as it can 
favour strategic behaviours (Matzdorf). 
 All else being equal, contracting and monitoring are cheaper when the 
number of agents is small. That regards for instance collective agreements 
and the advantages of embedding result based in collective-related 
schemes.  
 The relevance of well functioning institutions to achieve better results and 
the need of intermediaries to partially compensate where such institutions 
are not in place.  
 Incentives promoting innovation are generally more cost-effective in the 
long-run as adoption of new green technologies or innovative 
agroecological practices will lower the cost of  protecting the 
environment.  
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Given these range of challenges, several improvements are streamlined in 
literature suggesting and elaborating on new forms of contract solutions. Among 
these, it is worth mentioning (Hanley et al.,  2012; White ):  
 Paying for outcomes not actions; 
 Determining optimal contract length; 
 Devising incentives for spatial coordination such as top-up bonuses when 
neighbours participate to the same scheme or spatially connected 
auctions which give greater weight to bids which are spatially adjacent 
to each other; 
 Focus on contract set-up that reduces transactions costs such as search, 
negotiation, and administrative costs (Mettepenningen et al., 2009).  
 The consideration of reasons for AES uptake beyond profit maximization 
as other motivations are also important (e.g. cultural aspects, Burton 
2008).  
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4 Case study search and setting-up of the database 
 
As described in the CONSOLE Project DOA, task 2.3 is based on case studies. 
According to D1.1, a case study is intended as a case of real implementation of 
a specific contract solution (limited to contracts consistent with the scope 
above) in an area or region. It can involve several participating actors and farms, 
and several individual cases of implementation of the same contract; for the 
purposes of covering failures, it can also include real life proposals of contract 
solutions that for some reasons have never arrived at the stage of generating 
impact, but that can provide insights from their story, e.g. measures that opened 
calls without participation; contract proposals with no uptake, etc. 
The search of case studies fitting to the task objectives started reviewing scientific 
literature by means of search engines such as SCOPUS or WOS. The aim was 
however to enlarge the range of case studies by focusing on available grey 
literature such as reports, good practice manuals, project evaluations, etc. able 
to identify existing experiences and potential innovative solutions.  
The focus on grey literature allowed to include case studies that might be not the 
target of research for different reasons but able nonetheless to offer examples of 
good practices and provide lessons from the real world. On the other hand, the 
inclusion of scientific literature allowed the inclusion of potential innovative 
solutions and analyses from extensive reviews. In this view, the search has also 
included working papers and/or not peer reviewed documents (including PhD 
dissertations) focused on on-field experiments. 
Modelling exercises, on the contrary, have not been included in the database. 
The present deliverable goal is indeed to learn from existing experience and in 
particular real-world cases where solutions have been implemented. in that way, 
task 2.3 retains the same scope of task 2.2 and is not concerned by theoretical 
exercises that will be the focus of task 4.1. 
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5 Presentation of the database and the reviewed case 
studies 
 
Data base synopsis: 
the task is still running with around 110 documents collected. These documents 
have been selected and included in a database according to their focus on 
policy solutions for an improved delivery of ecosystem services and/or public 
goods. The selected documents have been catalogued to build a list of solutions 
and develop an analysis to feed into Deliverable D2.2 
updated 01/11/2020: 
N. of documents, 120 
N. of documents selected, 79 
N. of scientific peer-reviewed documents 38 
/report/grey lit.,  41  
Countries covered: 25 (but many documents provide reviews covering 
continental or worldwide cases) 
 
This section distils the lessons learned from cases and solutions developed 
beyond the CONSOLE EU case study sample, aiming at an improved delivery of 
AECPGs. The range of different agri-environmental contracts reported in this 
section have been reviewed in the task 2.3 “Analysis of successful experiences 
outside Europe”: the objective of that task is the building of a catalogue of 
experiences from different contexts that could add new and interesting 
perspectives for application in the EU and to feed into WP2 and the CONSOLE 
project a wider range of opportunities for contract design. 
To optimise the relevance for the CONSOLE project, the task 2.3 will build a living 
document to support the activities of the project with a particular attention on 
grey literature to scan potential solutions able to overcome the hurdles for the 
implementation of new contract solutions. 
In table 11, the current review of cases is outlined. 113 documents have been 
collected and screened. Among these, 65 cases have been reviewed. In 
addition, the data base includes 8 reviews of cases aimed at finding limitations 
and/or reasons for success of several cases worldwide, and 2 documents 
focusing on potential solutions that are proposed but not applied in the real 
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world. As described in section 3 for the EU cases, many cases belong to more 
than one contract type as shown in the following table. 
  Secondary approach type 
  Result 
based 
Collective  Value 
chain 
Land 
tenure 
Prim
ary 
approach 
type 
Result 
based 
35 7   
Collective  8 13   
Value chain 1 1 2  
Land tenure 1 4 1 14 
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF CASES PER CONTRACT TYPE REVIEWED FROM OUTSIDE THE EU. THE TABLE 
OUTLINES THE NUMBER OF CASES WHERE A MIXED APPROACH INVOLVING MORE THAN ONE 
SOLUTION TYPE WAS PROPOSED. 
 
In the review of cases beyond the CONSOLE EU case studies, result-based 
contracts are the most commonly found. Moreover, collective agreements are 
the contract type more commonly mixed with other forms of contract solutions. 
Currently, value chain contracts are the least represented solution. The search of 
that kind of contracts will be more specifically focused in the future efforts 
regarding the task 2.3. 
It should be noticed that the reviewed cases are developed in socioeconomic 
and environmental contexts that are different from the EU. In addition, the policy 
context is usually not embedded in a wider policy framework as the CAP. That 
can reduce the transferability of the lessons learned to the EU. On the other hand, 
in many cases the tradition of e.g. result-based solutions is longer than in the EU 
and that will give interesting real-word examples to develop this kind of solutions 
in the EU. 
The improved solutions that have been reviewed are developed to improve the 
delivery of AECPGs and tackle a range of limitations of more traditional 
contracts. A range of limitations of traditional forms of contracts can be 
summarized in: general difficulties in building of collectives, technical/economic 
complexity of monitoring results, reduced uptake due to high risks, administrative 
burden, spatial mismatch between provision of services and benefits in case of 
“global” AECPGs (e.g. carbon stock).  
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6 A catalogue of case studies 
 
According to the goal of task 2.3 (cfr. section 2), the catalogue of case studies is 
scanned to identify approaches that match with the contract features targeted 
in CONSOLE and to highlight potential options/ initiatives that can help to 
overcome weaknesses and/or hurdles for the implementation of enhanced 
contracts. Accordingly, five main categories are identified. Some are innovative 
solutions but with little evidence about their effective potential and feasibility, 
other are less innovative but useful to show critical factors for success. 
In many cases, the examples are localized to specific case studies and an overall 
national policy framework (like the CAP) is in general missing (except for 
examples from USA and China). Moreover, a number of examples are 
developed in socioeconomic contexts that are different from the EU (e.g. 
subsistence farming). These issues should be taken into account to assess the 
feasibility of their application in Europe. 
 
6.1 A selection of most promising approaches 
In the reviewed cases, the contract arrangements outlining interesting solutions 
for CONSOLE are organized in three main streams as follows: 
- New arrangements of the actors involved in the contract. A widespread 
problem of agri-environmental schemes is to strike a balance between measures 
that are easy to uptake for the farmers and at the same time sufficiently fine-
tuned to improve the environment. Thus, the intermediary is in practice a catalyst 
for the success of more environmental-effective types of contracts. A range of 
solutions proposes the implementation of more articulated schemes facilitated 
by the introduction of intermediaries. The objective of the intermediary is the 
reduction of transaction costs (e.g. administration and organisation costs 
reduced by means of a third party) or to shift the risks from land managers to 
private or public investors (e.g. the risk of not achieving results in result-based 
solutions). Examples of these solutions are e.g. the Environmental Impact Bond 
(EIB), the Forest Bank Program in USA (also included in the EU cases as FI1), or a 
range of local watershed trusts developed in Latin America. In the EIB, the 
intermediary is a hub between land mangers (up-taking the measure), investors 
(buying green bonds) and public payer (granting interests to the investor if the 
result is achieved).  
- Improved solutions for direct/indirect monitoring of the results. Various 
approaches try to “circumvent” one of the most important hurdles in result-based 
schemes: monitoring of results. Several examples and studies propose to collect 
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a mix of direct and indirect information through different tools (e.g. auctions 
mixed with modelled results 1 ), remote sensing combined with models, self-
monitoring solutions, new “futuristic” options like the DNA barcoding. In this 
category, we also include the “joint liability” contract which combines collective 
and result-based solutions. The joint liability features a collective agreement 
where the payment is gauged on AECPGs results. The monitoring of results is 
however not based on a statistical sampling procedure that would not be 
feasible in terms of costs and efforts. Indeed, peculiar aspect of the collective 
agreement is to consider the result measured in one (or few) of the members of 
the collective as a direct proxy for the result of the whole collective.  
- Payment setting. E.g. conditional credits. In this category, we include solutions 
that leverage on more attractive payment types that in some cases can achieve 
higher acceptability among farmers. These examples are more common in 
developing countries or, more in general, in areas featuring high environmental 
stakes (e.g. Amazonia) under threats of agricultural expansion. In general, the 
incentive regards loans or better credit conditions linked to environmental 
commitments or result achievement. These approaches leverage on reducing 
the credit costs for land managers that in some cases could be more attractive 
than incentives and facilitate the uptake of the environmental measure. In some 
cases, it could be considered an anticipated payment as the credit is granted 
based on the commitment, whereas the result achievement is verified 
afterwards. 
This typology of contract improvement could help the categorization of new 
solutions. Indeed, the three streams could target different socio-economic 
contexts or even “farmers types”. For instance, the first solution type could be 
effective in cases of weak governance settings or when it is difficult to build-up a 
collective. The second group is useful when result-based solutions are considered 
acceptable by the farmers but the operational application of payments by result 
is complicate. Finally, the third solution type could stimulate the uptake of 
environmental schemes in specific contexts.  
  
                                                
1 Auctions are coupled with result‐based approaches so to prioritise the areas that are less expensive (better 
auctions from farmers) but also more effective in potential result (assessed by an ecological model). This solution is 
in theory very effective (best match between costs and effectiveness) but not based on direct monitoring of results. 
As the other solutions based or mixed with models, these solutions are not “pure” result‐based. 
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Environmental impact bond.  
(Examples in Dropbox: Goldman Sachs, Hall 2017, kalamayzer.) 
 
matching with CONSOLE scope: 
Result based contracts are considered a potential improvement of the 
effectiveness of contracts for AECPGs but two main hurdles connected with 
transaction costs are identified in literature: the first concerns the difficulty to 
implement an actual measurement of the result in particular when the output is 
complex (e.g. biodiversity). On the other hand, the interest in result based 
approaches is specifically linked to issues where the efficacy of the scheme is 
complicate to disentangle a-priori (i.e. uncertainty regarding the link between 
action and effect). That hampers the feasibility of result based contracts as the 
costs linked to monitoring are in some cases higher than the cost of the scheme 
itself.  
The second hurdle concerns the risk of not achieving the result that is shifted on 
farmers (even in cases where the fault is not of the farmer, e.g. behaviour of 
neighbours, climate extremes, etc.). That will reduce the uptake of such 
measures and the interest of farmers in particular when the result is not under the 
control of farmers and/or specific capacities are required (e.g. achieving an 
increased rate of nesting bird population).  
In this context, the Environmental impact bond can help to overcome both the 
hurdles as: the risk is not shifted on farmers but on private investors and monitoring 
the achievement of the result is committed to an intermediary (local) agency 
that can (under certain limits) adapt the scheme to ensure better results. 
Brief description of the approach: 
The approach is developed from the green bonds with the inclusion of result-
based prime payment. The scheme is summarized in the figure 2 (Hall et al., 2017) 
and regards 4 main actors: private investors providing the funding, an 
intermediary emitting bonds, a public institution granting the bond (+ interests) 
conditional to the results, and landholders/managers uptaking the scheme.  
The core is the intermediary that connect private funding (e.g. an investment 
trust) with contractors (farmers) and the public institution that grants the 
payment. In practice, the risk of achieving the result typical of result-based 
programmes is shifted from farmers to private investors, whereas the public 
institution should grant interests to investors in case of the results achievement. 
The critical factor is the establishment of the intermediary (e.g. a no-profit 
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agency) which should design, implement and eventually adapt the programme 
on-the-run to ensure the results.  
Strengths: combines advantages of both outcome-based and action-based 
schemes, farmers agree to uptake the actions designed by the intermediary 
without risks linked to results (but should agree a certain adaptation of the 
scheme to achieve the results). 
Weaknesses: availability of an intermediary with skills and capacity to make it 
working. Currently implemented just in one localized case study in USA for the 
development of green infrastructures, but other EIB proposals are appearing in 
states and municipalities throughout the country. Hall et al. 2017 proposes its 
application in New Zealand. Still, the technical problem of monitoring results is 
present as it is just shifted on the intermediary. 
 
 
  
fig 2 (Hall et al., 2017) schematic outline of the Environmental Impact Bond 
scheme 
 
Joint liability.  
(Examples in Dropbox: cranford 2011, see also Yang 2013). 
 
matching with CONSOLE scope: 
collective agreements and result-based approaches are core contract 
approaches in CONSOLE. The joint liability is potentially interesting as it combines 
both approaches and can reduce consistently the efforts related to monitoring 
results (one huge hurdle for implementing result-based). 
Brief description: 
The joint liability is essentially a collective agreement contract that considers the 
individual performance as a direct signal of the performance of the collective 
under contract. In doing that, the approach is a mix between collective and 
result-based programmes: a community or collective agrees to a payment 
scheme linked to a specific and measurable result. That result is however 
measured in a randomly selected part of the area under management (e.g. one 
farm). The collective performance is assessed on the base of that partial 
information (that could be inexact, but relies on social-control mechanisms). The 
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programme should in theory generate a community level monitoring effort to 
avoid risks to fail the results or non-compliance of some members. 
 
Strengths: strongly reduce the monitoring costs and allows therefore direct 
monitoring and high targeting of results. 
 
Weaknesses: it leverages on strong community-level interactions. Therefore, not 
easy application everywhere. It adds a further hurdle to the formation of a 
collective (payment partly dependent on neighbor behavior) and presumably 
increase transaction costs. 
 
Conditional credit  
(Examples in DropBox: IUCN 2009, wetlands international 2009, mandel 2009, 
Cranford 2011, Asuncao 2013, etc. ) 
 
Matching with CONSOLE scope: 
The main interest of CONSOLE on this case types lies in the cost reduction focus 
(credit interest reduction) in comparison to the increased income approach 
(monetary incentives for specific action) typical of EU agri-env schemes. For 
some farmers, cost reduction linked to achieving a specific result could be more 
attractive (e.g. tax reduction or lower interest rates on credit) than payments for 
a specific result. 
Brief description: 
The core of the conditional credit approach is to link the credit to a condition 
implying the provision of ecosystem services. The condition may include the 
uptake the measurement of results. The advantage for the farmer or the 
community consists in a partial or total interest rate reduction if specific results 
are achieved. 
 
Strengths: could be a mixed output/action based payment where the payment 
is linked to the action uptake and the interest rate reduction is linked to results. 
 
Weaknesses: scarce feasibility of the approach in EU (even though some 
interesting insights are present to improve current contract design). 
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Local markets/trust.  
(Examples in Dropbox:  water quality trading program, watershed schemes in 
lurie 2013, Nelson 2009). 
 
Matching with CONSOLE scope: 
A difficult aspect of payments for AECPGs is the design that matches with local-
scale contexts (both environmental and socio-economic). Local-scale design of 
schemes is more typical for watershed services. The services depend on the 
context to make the scheme more attractive for specific socioeconomic 
contexts (e.g. clean water, landslide protection, etc.). The main interest for 
CONSOLE lies in the organisational framework of these schemes that usually are 
based on a local trust. 
Brief description:  
A number of examples exist of local marketplaces typically for watershed 
services. The programme may involve a trust (public or private or mixed) that 
promote and implement the scheme. In other cases, a private sector (e.g. 
tourism) pays for specific services. The core of these programmes is the regional 
size, typically a watershed service scheme involving a urban centre and 
upstream lands and typical services are related to water.  
strengths: the local scale should promote interest in the buyers (residents). When 
a trust is created, the public institution does not need specific expertise and/or 
investments as the trust is in charge of design, implement, control and selling of 
environmental credits to the public institution.  
weaknesses: creation of the trust is not easy and not all services are fitting e.g. 
less direct benefits from biodiversity in comparison to clean water. 
 
Improved result‐based programmes.  
Matching with CONSOLE scope: 
As mentioned above, tone of the main critical aspect of result-based contracts 
are monitoring and risks connected to result achievement. Focusing these two 
issues, a range of studies and cases propose improved technical or institutional 
solutions for monitoring results: 
a. Some approaches propose potential improvements based on indirect 
monitoring (e.g. remote sensing or models) + self-monitoring, (Stroud, Ryan, Yang 
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2013, Hasund 2013, Sidemo-holm). Self-monitoring cannot involve complex 
targets or indicators but can be useful for habitat and basic richness-based 
biodiversity indicators. Problems of willingness for self-monitoring and trust in self-
monitoring need to be considered. 
b. Lowcost biodiversity monitoring techniques: DNA barcoding. Currently 
under study but not operational (as far as I know, but see recent research 
projects: potential breakthrough techniques in the next years) 
c. Results mixed with auctions. Tenders for results to disclose which result is less 
expensive according to farmers’ knowledge or which result involves lower risks 
for the farmers. Strengths: This approach can be related to “jointness” of services 
if the farmer considers a service of some worth for agricultural production (e.g. 
soil organic matter, earthworms). In that case, farmers could accept lower 
payments. Weaknesses: problems with additionality may arise (farmers tendering 
for results already present in the farm, e.g. nesting of a specific bird). Auctions 
could reduce the need for monitoring but still some monitoring effort is required. 
 
  
  
 
23 
 
7 Conclusions  
  On the base of the analysis, here following are listed the main reasons for 
success or failure of the cases beyond the CONSOLE EU case studies that are 
considered most interesting for the improvement of EU contract solutions. The 
reasons for success are based on a qualitative analysis of the case descriptions 
and are not presented in order of importance (cfr. Also D2.4)2.  
Reason for success 1: reducing risks linked to results. Focusing on variables that 
farmers perceive not under their control led to higher risk, pressure and “disutility” 
for farmers. For instance, the complexity to control and monitor results drove to a 
shift from result- to action-based schemes in the Florida Everglades Water 
scheme. On the contrary, focusing on long-term range of measurements (e.g. in 
a slot of several years in the Swiss pastures) ensured to limit the effect of adverse 
events on results. In the Environmental Impact Bond, the risk for farmers is shifted 
on private investors following a green bond scheme. That solution could be useful 
when farmers’ interest for result-based payments is low and privates’ interest for 
environmental results is high. However, in the Environmental Impact Bond  the 
land manager essentially agrees to uptake an action-based scheme and all the 
awareness/education added values acknowledged to result-based solutions 
are no more relevant3. 
Reason for success 2: reduced costs for monitoring results. In two cases, a high 
cost of monitoring was the reason that limited the scheme survival. On the 
contrary, in other cases relying on lower level information provided by farmers or 
volunteers resulted in higher efficacy. In a further example (joint liability), the cost 
of the information is reduced by reducing the sampling intensity. That could be 
particularly useful for “landscape level” species such as birds for instance that 
depend on landscape level practices and less on local on-farm practices. 
Reason for success 3: farmers’ interest and social revenue. In a pilot scheme in 
UK the high interest of farmers in the target variable (earthworms) helped to 
involve and engage them in the measurement and payment by result schemes. 
In the Prairies Fleuries in France, the possibility for farmers to show their capacity 
to their peers was considered a reason for success (including the prize ceremony 
at the national agriculture show). 
Reason for success 4: resources availability. Obviously, sufficient availability of 
funding is necessary. Successful examples include cases where available funds 
                                                
2 NB it is relevant to define the assessment of “reason for success”. In many cases, a solution was considered 
successful because the uptake by landholders was good or simply because the contract survived the setting up 
phase and was active after several years. In some cases, the implementation of the scheme was only in a pilot phase 
and the success is therefore potential. Success in terms of measured environmental result are very scarce also in 
the case of result‐based solutions. 
3 The intermediary in the EIB is nonetheless appointed to manage and adapt the scheme to improve the 
effectiveness of land managers’ actions. 
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were present. For instance the Vittel Water scheme in France where the private 
water investor was able to offer high payments and even the purchase of land 
in the watershed. However, it is relevant to notice that the availability of resources 
alone is not sufficient. Resources are effective when employed to facilitate a shift 
towards more environment-friendly practices.  
Reason for success 5: additionality. In some land tenure cases, the additionality 
was not a necessary condition. For instance, the biodiversity easements or the 
land fire abatement were granted for areas even though these were not 
probably objective of developments or agricultural expansion. These schemes 
are more similar to protection/preservation schemes. 
Reason for success 6: relying on existing collectives. The possibility to rely on a 
well-established collective ensures better results. On the other hand, the building 
ex-novo of a collective is usually complicate. It is the case of the carnivore 
payment scheme for predators’ cubs in Sweden. The payment was calculated 
on the expected disservice for the local Sami populations derived from the 
reindeer attacks of lynxes and wolverines. The Sami are traditionally organized in 
collectives (villages) and that eased the implementation of the scheme, 
monitoring of results and in general lower transaction costs. 
 
Reason for success 7: communication. In the Florida Everglades, the scheme 
started as result based, but payer and farmers agreed to shift to action based 
solutions after the first years. The monitoring was considered too complicate and 
stochastic both by the farmers involved and the public agency. Even though 
shifting from result-based to action-based schemes can be considered a failure, 
without mutual communication and willingness from both parties the scheme 
would have been stopped. In this example, we stress how communication and 
ability to adapt to constraints is relevant for the implementation of successful 
schemes. 
Reason for success 8: payment setting. In some cases, cost reduction is more 
attractive than higher revenues. That is the case of reducing interest rates or tax 
reductions conditional to some agreed environmental result. The cases following 
that approach are common in Latin America where credit access is sometimes 
a limitation. Therefore, the potential of this approach in EU needs to be 
considered carefully.  
Reason for success 9: appropriate intermediaries. In many cases, the existence 
or ad-hoc creation of an intermediary was a necessary condition for ensuring the 
implementation of more articulated and effective contracts. That is the case of 
many watershed trusts charged for organizing and distributing the payments for 
improving water quality. That is also the case for the Environment Impact Bond 
where the intermediary is the pivot of the whole scheme. 
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To a large extent the success factors listed above confirm insights from cases in 
the CONSOLE partner countries. However, they allow the consideration of a 
broader variety of solutions. On the other hand, this also depends on the specific 
institutional context where they are located, which means that potential for 
replication should be taken carefully. 
The fact that a large part of the experiences and certainly of the evidence is 
rather recent encourages the continuation of this task providing updates during 
the whole project life. 
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perù community based 
conservation of polylepis 
forest on Andes (21 
communities). 
voluntary and payment 
contract (birdwatching 
fees) 
c
o
ll
e
c
t
i
v
e 
    
na, local community is 
rewarded by tourism and 
manage wildlife 
accordingly 
cranfo
rd 
moura
to 
2011 
4
9
p
a
p
e
r  
geoforum v. 
39 
mexi
co 
forest conservation, 
biodiversity + carbon 
seq. 
an assessment between 
participants and not 
participant of values, 
institutions, size of 
community, etc. 
c
o
ll
e
c
t
i
r
e
s
ul
t 
b
a
s
   
na, local community is 
rewarded by tourism and 
manage wildlife 
accordingly 
kosoy 
2008 
 
18 
 
v
e 
e
d 
4
8
r
e
p
o
r
t  
Working 
Paper No. 
07-07 USAID 
mexi
co 
Payment for ES: 
watershed protection 
national coverage PES 
example in S. America 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
c
ol
le
c
ti
v
e 
     
southg
ate 
wund
er 
2007 
4
7
r
e
p
o
r
t  
Working 
Paper No. 
07-07 USAID 
ecu
ador 
Payment for ES: 
watershed protection 
 
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
u
r
e 
c
ol
le
c
ti
v
e 
     
southg
ate 
wund
er 
2007 
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4
6
r
e
p
o
r
t  
Working 
Paper No. 
07-07 USAID 
ecu
ador 
Payment for ES: 
watershed protection 
started as a direct 
monitoring for 
conditionality, then 
monitoring was 
unfeasible 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
c
ol
le
c
ti
v
e 
   
3 month roll by NGO then 
government then no 
monitoring because of 
effort required 
southg
ate 
wund
er 
2007 
4
5
p
a
p
e
r 
conservation 
biology v. 24 
mad
agas
car 
assessment of behaviour 
and attitude change 
following a community 
based PES 
one of few studies 
assessing impact on 
behaviour and attittude 
(even though based on 
self-reported changes 
and not observed) 
c
o
ll
e
c
t
i
v
e 
    
by NGO 
 
somm
erville 
2010 
4
4
r
e
p
o
research 
gate 
austr
alia 
multiple auction round design that favours 
biodiversity scores (33%), land score (22%) and 
aggregation of land. after the auction round the 
r
e
s
u
c
ol
le
c
   
photo evidence about 
grass biomass, self-
reporting + random audit 
windle 
2007 
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r
t  
sites are weighted to MAX biodiversity potential 
and aggregation of land 
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
ti
v
e 
4
3
r
e
p
o
r
t 
https://en.wi
kipedia.org/
wiki/Commu
nal_Areas_M
anagement_
Programme_
for_Indigeno
us_Resource
s 
zimb
abw
e 
payment for wildlife services (tourism hunting) as a 
substitute to agricultural expansion 
v
a
l
u
e 
c
h
a
i
n 
c
ol
le
c
ti
v
e 
   
na, local community is 
rewarded by tourism and 
manage wildlife 
accordingly 
Com
munal 
Areas 
Mana
geme
nt 
Progra
mme 
for 
Indige
nous 
Resour
ces 
(CAM
PFIRE) 
4
2
p
a
conservation 
biology v. 17 
India predator conservation 
by means of community 
empirical study to assess 
feasibility 
c
o
    
na 
 
mishra 
2003 
 
21 
 
p
e
r 
based insurance and 
pastoral activity 
reduction 
ll
e
c
t
i
v
e 
4
1
r
e
p
o
r
t 
https://mark
etplace.car
bonmarketin
stitute.org/w
est-arnhem-
land-fire-
abatement-
walfa-
project/ 
austr
alia 
an example of carbon 
offset where the 
additionality is avoided 
fire risks 
in general the 
additionality is carbon 
stock increase, here is 
avoidance of carbon 
stock decrease  
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
u
r
e 
    
na 
 
West 
Arnhe
m 
Land 
Fire 
Abate
ment 
(WALF
A) 
Projec
t 
4
0
p
a
p
e
r  
conservation 
biology v. 24 
Tanz
ania 
community-based 
payment by tourism 
operators to reduce 
settlement and 
agriculture in a key 
wildlife area 
no public institution or 
NGO involved 
c
o
ll
e
c
t
    
na 
 
nelson 
2009 
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i
v
e 
3
9
r
e
p
o
r
t  
world bank Cost
a 
Rica 
a case study similar to 
the Vittel Water but a 
public hydric facility 
adopting water tarifs 
paid by the population 
and transferred to 
upstream landowners to 
finance forest protection 
or reforestation to 
protect water quality 
and regimation 
covers c.a. 10000 ha. 
similar schemes present 
in S. America 
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
u
r
e 
    
payment by action and 
commitment for at least 
10 y. 
world 
bank 
2007 
3
8
p
a
p
e
r
/
r
e
p
o
rangelands USA  carbon offset description for rangelands in USA. 
interesting because results are monitored and 
because a "broker" institution facilitated the entry of 
rangers (National Carbon Offset Coalition and the 
North Dakota farmers Union). Also, farmers hurdles 
to adopt and percepions etc. are analysed 
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
u
r
e 
r
e
s
ul
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
   
estimation based on 
location. rangelands are 
extremely heterogenous 
and remote (and 
dangerous sometimes to 
survey). Monitoring costs 
with on ground methods 
are prohibitive 
gosnel
l 2001 
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r
t 
3
7
r
e
p
o
r
t  
national 
landcare 
program 
austr
alia 
list of granted 
community landcare 
projects 
not all targeting 
agriculture 
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
u
r
e 
c
ol
le
c
ti
v
e 
     
comm
unity 
landc
are 
grants 
3
6
r
e
p
o
r
t  
national 
landcare 
program 
austr
alia 
map of granted 
community landcare 
projects 
not all targeting 
agriculture 
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
u
r
e 
c
ol
le
c
ti
v
e 
     
landc
are 
map 
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3
5
r
e
p
o
r
t  
national 
landcare 
program 
austr
alia 
a list of programs 
supported for 
community environment 
grants 
not all targeting 
agriculture 
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
u
r
e 
c
ol
le
c
ti
v
e 
   
na 
 
caring 
for our 
countr
y 
3
4
p
a
p
e
r  
Economie 
Rurale 355 
Mor
occ
o 
choice exp to identify 
best practice for 
community participation 
to PES 
empirical analysis c
o
ll
e
c
t
i
v
e 
    
na 
 
moka
ddem 
2016 
3
3
r
e
p
o
MERIT 
project 
CH description of the Öko-
Qualitätsverordnung, 
ÖQV in Canton Lucerne 
described also by Zabel 
2019, the report presents 
other EU cases 
r
e
s
u
l
    
to enter the scheme at 
least 6 species from a list 
should be present in the 
pasture, MAX payment is 
1500 SFr. 
eranet 
report 
MERIT 
projec
t 
 
25 
 
r
t  
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
3
2
p
a
p
e
r  
American 
Agricultural 
economics 
association 
USA  an empirical study on 
facilitating team 
formation to achieve 
water quality 
improvement in the 
watershed and its results. 
one year experiment c
o
ll
e
c
t
i
v
e 
    
water quality data 
collection 
collins 
maille 
2008 
3
1
p
a
p
e
r  
land use 
Policy 
Swe
den 
a comparison between 
current and indicator-
measured payments in 
Sweden. With indicators 
the policy is more 
efficient but could 
infringe WTO CAP 
principles, 2nd problem 
is regards the calculation 
theoretical approach 
applied in 2 case studies 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
    
aerial photo, satellite, 
survey, GIS 
Hasun
d 2013 
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of the payment for result 
unit, 3rd problem is that 
using proxies as 
indicators triggers 
strategic behaviour 
(maximising the proxy 
and not the result) 
e
d 
3
0
p
a
p
e
r  
The 
Australian 
Journal of 
Agricultural 
and 
Resource 
Economics, 
56, pp. 1–21 
Austr
alia 
 A comparison between 
auction, fixed payment 
and payment by results: 
fixed payments are the 
least cost-efficient, 
payment by results is 
second best after 
auctions. 
NB not a case study but 
a theoretical application 
using satellite data and 
farm economic data. 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
    
satellite + vegetation to 
measure a change in 
species 
white 
and 
Sadler 
2012 
2
9
r
e
p
o
r
t 
IEEP CH Rebflächen mit 
natürlicher Artenvielfalt 
(ÖQV) 
 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
    
orchards vineyards IEEP 
result 
based 
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b
a
s
e
d 
2
8
r
e
p
o
r
t 
IEEP CH Öko-
Qualitätsverordnung, 
ÖQV 
maybe the same as 
described in Zabel 2019 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
    
species rich grasslands IEEP 
result 
based 
2
7
r
e
p
o
r
t 
IEEP CH Pastures in Canton 
Solothurn 
maybe the same as 
described in Zabel 2019 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
    
species rich grasslands IEEP 
result 
based 
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s
e
d 
2
6
r
e
p
o
r
t  
thefreshwat
ertrust.org 
USA  the freshwater trust acts 
as an intermediary 
between buyer an seller 
providing "quantified 
conservation" and 
ensure credits are based 
on results 
the trust sells cooling 
water credits to the city 
water treatment facility 
to comply with water 
temperature after 
sewage treatment. 
Cooling systems would 
be more expensive than 
incentivizes to 
landholders and credits 
are measured in calories 
absorbed. The results 
seem strongly based on 
models  
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d
  
    
the trust monitors the 
results using dta and 
technology, not clear 
how and how much it 
costs... 
water 
quality 
tradin
g 
progra
m 
2
5
r
e
p
o
r
t  
wri.org USA  another biodiversity 
offset credit scheme 
(habitat for gopher 
tortoise credit) 
monitoring will be peer 
reviewed and science-
based but still under 
development  
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
    
credits depend on 
monitoring net 
conservation benefit 
gophe
r 
toroise 
 
29 
 
u
r
e 
2
4
r
e
p
o
r
t  
 
USA  technical report of pilot water retention programs 
including the Lynch and Shabman report case. 
Started as result-based but then became fixed fee 
based on average historical data of water volume 
because preferred by farmers and payer  
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
    
nutrient loads and water 
stored 
south 
florida 
water 
district 
2018 
2
3
r
e
p
o
r
t  
National 
wetlands 
Newsletter 
USA  an exampl of program 
developed as result-
based but adapted as 
fixed year payment 
because of stochastic 
fluctuations of results. 
Objective is incentives 
for dispersed water 
retention to improve 
costs incurred by farmers 
+ lump sum are the basis 
for calculating the 
incentive 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
    
reduction in nutrient loads 
and volume of water 
retention, but such 
variables depend on 
rainfall and both buyer 
and seller prefer fixed 
amount based on models 
and evidence on water 
retention functioning 
Lynch 
Shab
man 
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water quality and floods 
in the Florida Everglades 
e
d 
provided by the farmers + 
pump records data. 
2
2
r
e
p
o
r
t  
consevationf
und.org 
USA  it is an easement, where 
a property enters into a 
conservation bank 
accompanied by a trust 
account (ensured by the 
property) and can sell 
conservation credits for 
biodiversity offset. The 
credits depends on the 
species protected as 
established through 
monitoring. 
easement forest 
Maryland 
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
u
r
e 
    
the US wildlife service 
detrmines the credit in 
monitoring rounds at year 
0 10 15 20 and then every 
10 years. 
Fitzger
ald 
ranch 
2
1
r
e
p
o
r
t  
pag. 26 New 
Zeal
and 
based on the 
Environmental Impact 
Bond idea: shifts risk from 
taxpayer to investor 
proposal, not currently 
applied 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
    
an evaluator acts as 
monitoring entity to report 
impacts to the 
government that pays 
interest rates 
hall 
2017 
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e
d 
2
0
r
e
p
o
r
t  
pag. 130 USA  CSP COnservation 
Stewardship program. 
considered a payment 
for performance as 
higher payment is 
foreseen for higher 
performance.  
now the payment 
considers costs and 
performance 
(estimaated) for 
different practices 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
    
estimate of 
conservation 
performance  
res
ult 
ba
se
d 
on 
mo
del
ling 
USDA 
2019 
1
9
r
e
p
o
r
t  
pag. 124 USA CRP conservation 
reserve program 
incentivises land 
retirement and grassland 
protection (grazing can 
be allowed). An 
Environmental Benefits 
rate is calculated to 
evaluate bids and select 
the land at or under 
market rental rate. 
22 M ha enrolled in 2018 
(more than 36 M in 2007). 
payment is not 
depending on results, 
but potential results are 
used to admit or not the 
bid. Moreover, if farmers 
agree to retire land they 
have no land use 
choices 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
    
the Env. Benefits 
Index is an 
assessment of 
potential effects and 
requested asking 
price to optimize 
cost-efficiency 
ex-
ant
e 
res
ult 
mo
del
ing 
USDA 
2019 
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1
8
r
e
p
o
r
t  
pagiola 2004 
ecol econ 
nicar
agu
a, 
Colo
mbi
a, 
Cost
a 
Rica 
extensive report 
published on ecol econ 
idem like pagiola 2004 * 
    
idem 
 
pagiol
a 2004 
1
7
p
a
p
e
r  
pagiola 2007 
ecological 
economics 
nicar
agu
a, 
Colo
mbi
a, 
Cost
a 
Rica 
pilot World bank project 
financed to a local 
NGO. Objective is the 
application of improved 
pastoral practices that 
after a starting period 
under incentives 
(should) go on in the 
long term because the 
new improved practices 
are better and more 
profitable.  
result based as 
payments are made 
after the ESI is assessed, 
farmers are free to 
decide land use (but 
advisors suggest best 
practices) and the ESI 
strictly depends on the 
land use type. Payments 
were made for the 
purpose of overcoming 
cost barriers to adoption 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
    
payments depends on 
increase of biodiversity 
and CO2 sequestration 
based on an 
Environmental Services 
Index (expert panel rate 
land uses) + verification 
with 
bird/butterfly/ants/mollus
cs monitoring and 
research. Payment levels 
were set at $75 per 
incremental point per 
year over a 4-year period, 
up to a 
 
pagiol
a 2007 
Regio
nal 
Integr
ated 
Silvop
astoral 
Ecosys
tem 
Mana
geme
nt 
Projec
t 
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maximum of $4,500 per 
farm.  
1
6
r
e
p
o
r
t  
LUPG018 
pag. 191 
Austr
alia 
auctions for securing 
multiple goods 
(enhancement of 
biodiversity, control of 
salinity and ground 
water recharge 
abatement). In addition, 
landholders are 
encouraged to put in 
joint bids for 
conservation sites 
(where these sites cut 
across boundaries of 
tenure or where sites are 
geographically close 
and would benefit from 
joint management) 
idem, result is potential 
but considers also 
aspects as distance 
between sites to get to 
an optimal biodiversity 
impact (by model)  
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
c
ol
le
c
ti
v
e 
   
regional metric of 
‗biodiversity 
complimentarily‘ which 
takes into account 
‗synergistic‘ effects 
caused by the number, 
size and distance of sites, 
in addition to the 
calculation of an 
environmental benefits 
index. 
The 
Auctio
n for 
Lands
cape 
Recov
ery 
pilot 
schem
e 
1
5
r
e
p
o
LUPG018 
pag. 182 
austr
alia 
auctions to select the 
land that will be entered 
into the scheme, The 
objective is to conserve 
the biodiversity of native 
applied in pilot areas. 
Sites offered in the bid 
are surveyed to assess its 
contribution to the 
objectives. The result is 
r
e
s
u
l
    
Assessment of single 
sites is made through 
the calculation of 
the Biodiversity 
Benefits Index 
ex 
ant
e 
res
ult 
The 
Bush 
Tender 
pilot 
 
34 
 
r
t  
vegetation through 
means of stock 
exclusion, the retention 
of fallen trees and timber 
and through the control 
of weed and invasive 
species. 
actually potential and 
based on ex-ante 
ecological data  
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
(Biodiversity 
Significance Score x 
Habitat Services 
Score / Cost 
announced by the 
landholder) and the 
necessary 
ecological data is 
collected by 
scientists. 
mo
del
ling 
schem
e 
1
4
r
e
p
o
r
t  
LUPG018 
pag. 130 
den
mark 
This scheme has a long 
history and originated in 
the west of the country in 
the late 1800s in an effort 
to prevent soil erosion. By 
the early 1900s, 
approximately 150 local 
planting associations 
had been formed. The 
scheme is now 
applicable to the whole 
country and has 
expanded its objectives 
to also increase biotopes 
and ecological corridors 
the local planting 
association decides and 
coordinates farmers 
where and when 
planting but species are 
fixed and monitoring 
regards good 
agricultural conditions of 
hedgerows not wildlife or 
ecological corridors or 
effects on erosion 
c
o
ll
e
c
t
i
v
e 
    
5% of hedgerows are 
monitored yearly 
Hedg
erow 
Plantin
g 
Sche
me 
 
35 
 
on agricultural land in 
addition to preventing 
erosion. The scheme is 
not exclusive to 
collectives only, 
individuals can apply but 
in 2005 78% of all funded 
projects were collective 
1
3
p
a
p
e
r 
Land Use 
Policy 
Fran
ce 
prairies fleuries. 
Flowering meadows. 
Result based as an 
award: farmers 
participate to a contest 
where the pasture more 
biodiverse (=more 
flowers) are awarded a 
prize  
NB not extra EU. farmers 
are free to manage their 
pasture to achieve the 
best result and be 
awarded  
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
    
on-ground survey fleury 
2015 
1
2
r
e
p
o
https://www.
brookings.ed
u/blog/educ
ation-plus-
developmen
USA not applied in 
agriculture but the 
Environmental Impact 
Bonds can be a 
reference. These are a 
By transferring risk, EIBs 
can support innovative 
natural infrastructure 
solutions to achieve an 
outcome which may 
r
e
s
u
l
    
Stormwater runoff 
reduction will be 
measured at two points in 
the 5-year plan to first 
create a baseline, and 
Gold
man 
Sachs 
DC 
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r
t 
t/2018/01/17
/paying-for-
social-
outcomes-a-
review-of-
the-global-
impact-
bond-
market-in-
2017/ 
type of green bonds: 
contract between 
parties, where a portion 
of the repayment to 
investors is based on the 
outcome of a particular 
intervention. In the case 
of the DC Water 
environmental impact 
bond, the outcome is 
the efficacy of green 
infrastructure in reducing 
stormwater runoff, versus 
conventional grey 
infrastructure options. 
otherwise be too risky for 
utilities and public 
entities to pursue. -the ES 
seller is a public agency 
and not a landholder- 
but pay-rate depends 
on results: If runoff flow is 
reduced as expected, 
DC Water will pay full 
principal and an 
effective return of 3.43% 
to the investors (Calvert 
Foundation and 
Goldman Sachs) at 
maturity. If runoff 
reduction is more 
effective than 
expected, DC Water will 
pay investors a bonus 
“outcome payment” of 
USD 3.3 million (an 
effective return of 
around 6.4%). DC water 
will then work to scale up 
green infrastructure 
implementation across 
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
then to evaluate the 
intervention. 
Water 
EIB 
 
37 
 
the District. If, on the 
other hand, runoff 
reduction underperforms 
expectations, investors 
will pay a “risk-sharing 
payment,” meaning 
they will have a lower 
effective return from the 
investment of just 0.5%. If 
this was the case, DC 
water will consider 
stopping all future green 
infrastructure projects 
and continue to invest in 
grey infrastructure. 
1
1
r
e
p
o
r
t  
https://www.
forestresilien
cebond.co
m/ 
USA Investors provide upfront capital with public and 
private beneficiaries then making contracted 
payments based on the water, fire, and other 
benefits created by the restoration activities 
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
u
r
e 
r
e
s
ul
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
   
an evaluation board 
follows several economic 
valuation methods such 
as avoided costs 
(https://www.forestresilien
cebond.com/roadmap-
report/forest-resilience-
bond) but it does not 
seem to include on-
ground surveys  
forest 
resilien
ce 
bond 
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1
0
r
e
p
o
r
t 
FAO Fran
ce 
description of the  Vittel 
case study where Nestlè 
Waters has implemented 
a water protection 
scheme in the 
watershed. 
land purchased and left 
in usufruct 
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
u
r
e 
r
e
s
ul
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
wate
r 
li
v
e
st
o
c
k 
f
a
r
m
in
g 
p
ri
v
a
t
e 
research team monitors 
water pollution levels, 
Nestlè intermediary check 
practices. 
FAO 
Vittel-
Franc
e 
9 r
e
p
o
r
t  
cec.org Can
ada 
(Sask
atch
ewa
n) 
design of a pay-by-result 
scheme to conserve 
Sprague’s Pipit (Anthus 
spragueii) and Swift Fox 
(Vulpes velox). Two 
species at risk 
it is stated that 
monitoring results-based 
PES programs can cost 
as much or more than 
the incentive payments 
to land managers in 
programs where species 
at risk are the target 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
    
on-ground survey. Several 
options envisaged: land 
managers- other 
organizations - volunteers 
prairie 
beef 
and 
biodiv
ersity 
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8 p
a
p
e
r  
proceedings 
royal society 
na cfr. §2.b Many projects 
may facilitate 
implementation of result-
based about biodiversity 
and ecosystem services 
not a case study but 
analys of potential for 
monitoring pollinators, 
carbon stock, 
biodiversity & ES in 
agricultural land (citizen 
science-based) 
* 
 
biodivers
ity, 
carbon 
stock 
 
citizen science ryan 
2018 
7 p
a
p
e
r 
land use 
Policy v. 63  
Perù 
Bolivi
a 
pilot payments for 
agrobiodiversity 
conserva-tion services 
(PACS) schemes in the 
High Andes aimed at 
enhancingthe 
conservation of 
traditional quinoa 
landrace varieties.  
focus on collective 
tenders not on results. 
Survey on different 
performance of group 
bid/type/interaction 
including comply and in-
group monitoring 
c
o
ll
e
c
t
i
v
e 
    
collective group self-
monitoring (taken into 
account) 
narloc
h 2017 
6 P
h
D 
t
h
e
si
s 
UNI-Bonn.de ethio
pia 
cfr. ch. 4 empirical 
application of outcome 
based payment 
do outcome based 
contracts achieve better 
results and trigger  
intrinsic motivation? 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
    
on-ground survey Andelt
ova 
2017 
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s
e
d 
5 p
a
p
e
r 
EAAE 2011 
Congress 
Swe
den 
linx and wolverine 
population scheme: PES 
for 61 Sami communities 
in Sweden 
c.a. 20,000 euro per new 
offspring to the 
community 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
c
ol
le
c
ti
v
e 
   
on-ground survey (locals + 
technician together) 
zabel 
2011 
4 p
a
p
e
r 
Conservatio
n and policy 
Swe
den 
the Sweden case with a 
deeper analysis of 
strategies  to circumvent 
the collective-action 
problem.  
refereence to  a set of 
criteria defined by 
Ostrom (1990) to 
evaluate the common-
pool regimes of the 
Swedish reindeer herders 
and to provide an 
assessment of the 
workability of the ex ante 
compensation scheme. 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
c
ol
le
c
ti
v
e 
   
on-ground survey (locals + 
technician together) 
zabel 
2008 
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e
d 
3 p
a
p
e
r 
land use 
Policy 
Switz
erlan
d 
payments for species 
diversity on pastures 
currently in 1st scheme 
round: payments for 
species-rich pastures as 
surveyed at year 0; after 
8 years payments are 
calculated on measured 
improvements  in 
comparison to year 0. 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
    
on-ground survey 
(technician from local 
agriculture agencies on 
an agreed protocol) 
zabel 
2019 
2 p
a
p
e
r 
Ecological 
Economics 
India on the basis of the outcome based payment for  
carnivores in sweden, the paper presents a survey 
on acceptability of a similar scheme for tigers 
r
e
s
u
l
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
    
on-ground survey 
(potential) 
zabel 
engel 
2010 
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1 r
e
p
o
r
t 
https://www.
un-redd.org/ 
inter
nati
onal  
REDD+ is a performance-
based payment system 
that values carbon in 
standing trees. Tropical 
countries will be 
compensated for 
carbon that is stored in 
their forests as a result of 
a REDD+ project 
compared to a 
benchmark called forest 
reference emissions 
level. The more the 
rainforest countries 
reduce deforestation or 
forest degradation, or 
their forests store more 
carbon through various 
management and 
conservation activities, 
the more funding they 
shall receive. 
in Skutsch, et al. 2011. 
REDD+ is considered 
performance-
based(Alternativemodel
sforcarbon 
paymentstocommunitie
sunderREDDþ: 
acomparisonusingthePol
ismodel 
ofactorinducements.Env
ironmentScienceandPoli
cy14,140–151.) 
l
a
n
d 
t
e
n
u
r
e 
r
e
s
ul
t 
b
a
s
e
d 
   
forest inventories (+ 
remote) 
REDD+ 
Reduc
ing 
Emissio
ns 
from 
Defore
station 
and 
land 
Degra
dation 
NIBIO 
report 
 
